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Abstract—Image classification is an important task in today’s
world with many applications from socio-technical to safety-
critical domains. The recent advent of Deep Neural Network
(DNN) is the key behind such a wide-spread success. However,
such wide adoption comes with the concerns about the reliability
of these systems, as several erroneous behaviors have already
been reported in many sensitive and critical circumstances. Thus,
it has become crucial to rigorously test the image classifiers to
ensure high reliability.
Many reported erroneous cases in popular neural image
classifiers appear because the models often confuse one class with
another, or show biases towards some classes over others. These
errors usually violate some group properties. Most existing DNN
testing and verification techniques focus on per image violations
and thus fail to detect such group-level confusions or biases. In
this paper, we design, implement and evaluate DeepInspect, a
white box testing tool, for automatically detecting confusion and
bias of DNN-driven image classification applications. We evaluate
DeepInspect using popular DNN-based image classifiers and
detect hundreds of classification mistakes. Some of these cases
are able to expose potential biases of the network towards certain
populations. DeepInspect further reports many classification
errors in state-of-the-art robust models.
Index Terms—testing, deep learning, white box, DNN
I. INTRODUCTION
Image categorization is a well-studied problem in computer
vision, where a model is trained to classify an image into
single or multiple predefined categories [1]. It has a plethora
of applications in safety-critical domains like self-driving cars,
health care, etc. Even in our day-to-day life we often use image
classifiers: for example, Google Photo search, Facebook image
tagging, etc. With the advent of Deep Neural Networks (DNN),
such image classification tasks have seen major breakthroughs
over the past few years—sometimes even matching human-level
accuracy under some conditions [2].
In spite of such spectacular success, we often encounter
high-impact classification errors made by these models, as
shown in Table I. For example, in 2015, Google faced huge
backlash due to a notorious error in its photo-tagging app,
which tagged pictures of dark-skinned people as "gorillas" [3].
After manual investigation of some related public reports, we
find two main causes behind such mistakes: (i) Confusion:
The model cannot differentiate one class from another. For
example, it has been recently reported that Google Photos
confuse skier and mountain [4], and (ii) Bias: The model shows
*The first two authors contributed equally to this work
disparate outcomes between two related groups. For example,
Zhao et al. [5] in their paper “Men also like shopping” find
classification bias towards women on activities like shopping,
cooking, washing, etc.
These errors are specific to a class of images rather than any
particular input image—at a high level, the intuition is that
some class properties are getting violated in such cases. For
example, in the case of bias reported by Zhao et al. [5], a DNN
model should not have different error rates while classifying
the gender of a person in the shopping category. Thus, unlike
individual image properties, this is a class property defined over
all the shopping images with men and women. Any violation
of such property affects the whole class, e.g., man is more
likely to be predicted as woman when he is shopping, although
many individual images in this category can still be predicted
correctly.
Due to the lack of such formally specified properties, while
designing a DNN, developers usually follow some mental
models of informal specifications; an error occurs when the
application “produced harmful and unexpected results” w.r.t.
that informal specification, as observed by Google Brain
researchers [9]. Without such specification, traditional software
testing techniques that test w.r.t. some oracle will remain
inadequate [10]–[12].
One simple workaround to detect class-level violations
could be to simply analyze the class separations because after
all the DNN models are supposed to learn this separation.
To identify possible sources of confusion/bias-related errors
we should check whether the class-separation is enough to
distinguish clearly between two classes. In fact, traditional ML
testing/validation step indirectly evaluates such class-separation
by measuring the model’s accuracy. However, doing this in a
black-box manner is inadequate, especially for a pre-trained
model, because (i) the training and testing distributions can
widely differ; hence the labeled data used to validate the model
might not measure the class separation accurately in a real-
world test environment and miss the corner-cases, and (ii) the
input space (e.g., pixel space) is not well-specified to identify
the class properties or their separation.
In this work, we propose a novel white box technique to
capture the separation between two classes. For a set of test
input images, we compute the probability of activation of a
neuron per predicted class. Thus, for each class, we create
a vector of neuron activations where each vector element
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TABLE I: Examples of real-world errors reported in neural image classifiers
Error Type Name Report Date Outcome
Gorilla Tag[3] Jul 1, 2015 Black people were tagged as gorilla by Google photo app.
Confusion Elephant is detected Aug 9, 2018 Image Transplantation (i.e. replacing sub-region of an image by
in a room[6] another image containing trained object) leads to mis-classification.
Google Photo[4] Dec 10, 2018 Google Photo confuses skier and mountain.
Nikon Camera[7] Jan 22, 2010 Camera shows bias toward Caucasian faces when detecting people’s blinks.
Men Like Shopping[5] July 29, 2017 Multilabel object classification models show bias towards women on
Bias activities like shopping, cooking, washing etc.
Gender Shades[8] 2018 Open source face recognition services provided by IBM, Microsoft, and Face++
have higher error rates on darker-skin females for gender classification.
corresponds to a neuron activation probability. If the distance
between two vectors is too close (compared to other class-
vector pairs) that means the DNN under test cannot effectively
distinguish the two classes because often a similar set of
neurons are activated by the corresponding class members.
To this end, we propose a novel white-box test strategy,
DeepInspect. We evaluate DeepInspect for both single- and
multi-label classification models in 10 different settings. Our
experiments demonstrate that DeepInspect, unlike existing
white-box techniques, can efficiently detect both Bias and
Confusion errors in popular neural image classifiers. For all
the models we have tested, DeepInspect reports a large number
of classification errors with high precision. We further check
whether DeepInspect can detect such classification errors in
state-of-the-art models designed to be robust against norm-
bounded adversarial attacks; DeepInspect finds hundreds of
errors proving the need for orthogonal testing strategies to
detect such class-level mispredictions. Further, unlike common
DNN testing techniques [13], [14], we do not need to generate
additional transformed images to find these errors.
We summarize our contributions as follows:
• We design a novel white-box testing framework to
automatically detect confusion and bias errors in DNN
based visual recognition models for image classification.
• We implement the proposed techniques in DeepInspect
and exhaustively evaluate DeepInspect and detect many
errors in state-of-the art DNN models.
• We have made the errors reported by DeepInspect public
at https://deeplearninginspect.github.io/DeepInspect. We
plan to release the code and processed data for public
use.
II. THEORY
A. DNN Background
Deep Neural Networks (DNN) are popular machine learning
models loosely inspired by the neural networks of human brains.
A DNN model learns the logic to perform a task from a set of
training examples. For example, an image recognition model
learns to recognize cows through training with lots of sample
images of cows.
A typical feed forward DNN consists of a set of connected
computational units, often referred as neurons, which are
arranged sequentially in a series of layers, The neurons
in different layers are connected with each other through
edges. Each edge has a corresponding weight. Each neuron
applies σ, a nonlinear activation function (e.g., ReLU [15],
Sigmoid [16]), on its inputs and sends the output to the
subsequent neurons. For image classification, convolutional
neural networks (CNNs) [17] are typically used, which consist
of layers with local spatial connectivity and sets of neurons
with shared parameters across space. Since our methods are
general, we will just refer to DNNs more broadly.
To build a DNN application, developers typically start with
a set of pre-annotated experimental data and divide it into three
sets: (i) training: to fit the model in a supervised setting (e.g.,
using stochastic gradient descent with gradients computed using
back-propagation [18]), (ii) validation: to tune the model hyper-
parameters, and (iii) evaluation: to evaluate the accuracy of the
trained model w.r.t. to a pre-annotated test dataset. Typically,
the training, validation, and testing data are drawn from the
same dataset. The semantics (F ) of the underlying task learned
by a DNN model highly depend on the training dataset and
are encoded as the weights of the edges in the network. If the
training data are changed, the semantics learned by the model
also change and essentially a different program is generated
[19]. Thus, a final deliverable DNN application is a combination
of the training data and the underlying DNN structure.
For image classification, a DNN can be trained in following
two settings: (i) Single-label Classification. In a traditional
single-label classification problem, each data is associated with
a single label l from a set of disjoint labels L where |L| >
1. If |L| = 2, the classification problem is called a binary
classification problem. If |L| > 2, it is called a multi-class
classification problem [20]. In popular image classification
tasks, MNIST, CIFAR-10/CIFAR-100[21] and ImageNet[22]
are all single-label classification tasks where each image can be
categorized into only one class. (ii) Multi-label Classification.
In a multi-label classification problem, each data is associated
with a set of labels Y where Y ⊆ L. COCO[23], NUS[24] and
imSitu[25] are multi-label classification tasks. For example,
an image from COCO dataset can be labeled as car, person,
traffic light and bicycle. A multi-label classification model is
supposed to predict car, person, traffic light and bicycle from
this image.
Given any single- or multi-label classification task, the DNN
classifier tries to learn the decision boundary between the
classes—all members of a class, say Ci, should be categorized
identically irrespective of their individual features, and members
of another class, say Cj , should not be categorized to Ci [26].
The DNN represents the input image in an embedded space
and then use a linear classifier (e.g., softmax) to classify these
representations. A class separation estimates how well the DNN
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has learned to separate a class from another. If the embedded
distance between two classes are too small compared to other
classes or lower than some pre-defined threshold, we assume
that the DNN could not separate them from each other.
B. Testing DNN Classifiers
Traditionally in ML, how well a DNN can classify and learn
class-separations is tested w.r.t. annotated ground truth data
[27]–[29]. During development time, since the training and
testing samples are usually drawn from the same distribution,
previous papers showed that such techniques are not adequate
to test real-world corner cases [13], [14], [30]–[32]. To detect
class-level violations, as shown in Table I, testing each class
separately w.r.t. the high-level class property (e.g., all the
possible cow images, such as a black cow with long horns, a
white cow with short horns, etc., should be classified as ranch
animal) can be a viable option. In fact, this is somewhat
similar to equivalence-partition testing [33]) in traditional
software engineering. However, in traditional SE it is usually
enough to test one candidate per equivalent class (EC) and the
boundary conditions. This is only true when the members of an
EC are homogeneous. For heterogeneous class members, such
as ours (e.g., white cow, black cow, etc.), we should test each
EC exhaustively [34]. But each EC can potentially have a large
number of members [35] and finding representative candidates
requires intelligently sampling a nonlinear, high-dimensional
space, which is inherently difficult. Thus, exhaustive black-box
testing is unfeasible.
Instead, we need a white-box metric, analogous to the
branch/path coverage metric, that can be used to approximately
represent each class. The popular approaches of white-box
testing in the literature are based on DNN structure that often
targets activated neurons and layers [13], [14], [30], [31].
However, these techniques are more suitable for testing the
network structure (e.g., how many neurons are activated) rather
than class properties. Also, these techniques are more suitable
for detecting image-level violations than class-level errors. For
example, the method proposed in [36] can detect adversarial
images at point-level but cannot be easily extended to identify
violations at a group-level. In this work, we address these
issues by introducing novel white-box techniques.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we provide a detailed technical description
of DeepInspect. Our experimental setting reflects a real-world
scenario where a customer gets a pre-trained model which is
running in a production system. The customer has the white
box access of the model to profile, although all the data in
the production system is unlabeled. Here, we primarily focus
on inspecting how well a pre-trained DNN has learned the
class-separation by testing it with a set of unlabeled data. In
the absence of ground truth labels, the classes are defined by
the predicted labels. We finally output class-pairs that are too
close as compared to the rest of the class pairs and report
potential confusion and bias errors accordingly. Figure 1 shows
the DeepInspect workflow.
Fig. 1: DeepInspect Workflow
A. Definitions
Before we start describing DeepInspect methodology, we
would like to introduce some definitions that we will follow
in the rest of the paper.
Neural-Path (NP ). For an input image x, we define neural-
path as a set of neurons that are activated by x.
Neural-Path per Class (NPC). For an class Ci, this metric
represents the total number of unique neural-paths activated
by all the inputs representing Ci.
n1
n4
n2
n5
n3
Input Outputhiddenlayers 
Fig. 2: Simplified image of activated neurons by the objects of
heterogeneous class cow.
For example, consider a class cow containing two images: a
brown cow and a black cow (see Figure 2). Let’s assume that
they activate two neural-paths: {n1, n2, n3} and {n4, n5, n3}.
Thus, the neural paths for class cow would be NPcow =
{{n1, n2, n3}, {n4, n5, n3}}. NPcow is further represented by
a vector (n11, n
1
2, n
2
3, n
1
4, n
1
5), where the superscripts represent
the number of times each neuron is activated by Ccow. In
fact, each C in a dataset can be expressed with such neuron
activation frequency vector, which captures how the model
interacts with that C.
Neuron Activation Probability: Leveraging how frequently a
neuron nj is activated by all the members from a class Ci, this
metric estimates the probability of a neuron nj to be activated
by Ci. Thus, we define:
P (nj | Ci) = |{cik | ∀cik ∈ Ci, out(nj , cik) > Th}||Ci|
We then construct a N ×M dimensional neuron activation
probability matrix, (ρ), (N is the number of neurons and M
is the number of classes) with its ij-th entry being P (nj | Ci).
ρ =
C1 ... Ci ... CM

n1 p11 p1M
... ...
nj pj1 ... pjM
... ...
nN pN1 pNM
(1)
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This matrix captures how a model interacts with a set of input
data. The column vectors (ραm) represent the interaction of
a class Cm with the model. Note that, in our setting, Cs are
predicted labels.
Since ρ is designed to represent each class, it should be able
to distinguish between different Cs. Next, we use ρ to find
two different classes of errors often found in DNN systems:
confusion and bias (see Table I).
B. Finding Confusion Errors
In an object classification task, when the model cannot
distinguish one object class from another, confusion occurs.
For example, as shown in Table I, a Google photo app model
confuses a skier with the mountain. Thus, finding confusion
errors means checking how well the model can distinguish
between objects of different classes. An error happens when
the model under test classifies an object with a wrong class, or
for multi-label classification task, predicts a class even though
no object from that class is present in the test image.
We argue that the model makes these errors because during
the training process the model has not learned to distinguish
well between the two classes, say a and b. Therefore, the
neurons activated by these objects are similar and the column
vectors corresponding to these classes: ραa and ραb will be
very close to each other. Thus, we compute the confusion
score between two classes as the distance between their two
probability vectors:
NAPVD(a, b) = ∆(a, b) = ραa − ραb
=
√√√√ nN∑
n=n1
(P (n|a)− P (n|b))2 (2)
If the ∆ value is less than some pre-defined threshold for
two pairs of classes, the model will potentially make mistakes
in distinguishing one from another, which results in confusion
errors. This ∆ is called NAPVD (Neuron Activation Probabiliy
Vector Distance).
C. Finding Bias
In an object classification task, bias occurs if the model under
test shows disparate outcomes between two related groups. For
example,
we find that ResNet-34 pretrained by imSitu dataset, often
mis-classifies a man with a baby as woman. We observe that in
the embedded matrix ρ, ∆(baby, woman) is much smaller than
∆(baby,man). Therefore, during testing, whenever the model
finds an image with a baby, it is biased towards associating
the baby image with a woman. Based on this observation, we
propose an inter-class distance based metric to calculate the
bias learned by the model. We define the bias between two
classes a and b over a third class c as follows:
bias(a, b, c) :=
|∆(c, a)−∆(c, b)|
∆(c, a) + ∆(c, b)
(3)
If a model treats objects of classes a and b similarly under
the presence of a third object class c, a and b should have
similar distance w.r.t. c in the embedded space ρ; thus, the
numerator of the above equation will be small. Intuitively, the
model’s output can be more influenced by the nearer object
classes, i.e. if a and b are closer to c. Thus, we normalize the
disparity between the two distances to increase the influence
of closer classes.
This bias score is used to measure how differently the given
model treats two classes in the presence of a third object class.
An average bias (abbreviated as avg_bias) between two objects
a and b for all class objects O is defined as:
avg_bias(a, b) :=
1
|O| − 2
∑
c∈O,c6=a,b
bias(a, b, c) (4)
The above score captures the overall bias of the model between
two classes. If the bias score is larger than some pre-defined
threshold, we report potential bias errors.
Using the above equations we develop a novel testing
framework, DeepInspect, to systematically inspect a DNN
implementing image classification tasks and look for potential
confusion and bias related errors. We implemented DeepInspect
in the Pytorch deep learning framework and Python 2.7. All of
our experiments were run on Ubuntu 18.04.2 with two TITAN
Xp GPUs.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
A. Study Subjects
We apply DeepInspect for both multi-label and single-
label DNN-based classifications. Under different settings,
DeepInspect automatically inspects 10 DNN models for 8
datasets. Table II summarizes our study subjects. We used
pre-trained models as shown in the table for all the settings
except for COCO with gender. For COCO with gender model,
we used the gender labels from [5] and trained the model in
the same way as [5]. There are 11,538 entities and 1788 roles
in total in the imSitu dataset. When inspecting imSitu model,
we only considered the top 100 most frequent entities or roles
in the test dataset.
Among the 10 DNN models, four of them are pre-trained
robust models that are trained using adversarial images along
with regular images. These models are pre-trained by provably
robust training approach proposed in [39]. Three robust models
with different network structures are trained using the CIFAR-
10 dataset [39]. The last robust model is a pre-trained model
in the Tiny ImageNet dataset [42].
B. Identifying Ground Truth (GT) Errors
To collect the ground truth we refer to the test images
truly misclassified by a given model. We then aggregate these
misclassified image points by their real and predicted class-
labels and estimate pair-wise confusion/bias.
1) GT of Confusion Errors: Confusion occurs when a DNN
often makes mistakes in disambiguating members of two
different classes. In particular, if a DNN is confused between
two classes, the classification error rate is higher between
the two classes than the rest of the class-pairs. Based on
this, we define two types of confusion errors for single-label
classification and multi-label classification separately:
Type1 confusions: In single-label classification, Type1 con-
fusion occurs when an object of true label a (e.g.,violin) is
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TABLE II: Study Subjects
Dataset Model
Task Name #classes CNN Models #Neurons #Layers Reported Result
COCO [23] 80 ResNet-50[5] 26,560 53 Conv 0.73 mean average precision
Multi-label COCO with gender[5] 81 ResNet-50[2] 26,560 53 Conv 0.71 mean average precision
classification NUS[24] 1000 ResNet-18[37] 5,800 21 Conv 0.26 mean average precision
imSitu[25] 205,095 ResNet-34[25] 8,448 36 Conv 0.37 mean accuracy
CIFAR-100[21] 100 CNN[38] 2,916 26 0.74 accuracy
Robust CIFAR-10[21] 10 Small (S) CNN[39] 158 8 0.69 accuracy
Single-label (R CIFAR-10) Large (L) CNN[39] 1,226 14 0.73 accuracy
classification ResNet[39] (R) 1,410 34 0.70 accuracy
ImageNet[22] 1000 ResNet-50[40] 26,560 53 Conv 0.75 accuracy
Robust Tiny ImageNet[41] 200 ResNet[42] 1,410 34 0.27 accuracy
(a) Confusions distribution (b) NAPVD distribution
Fig. 3: Identifying Type2 confusions for multi-classification
applications. LHS shows how we marked the ground truth errors
based on Type2 confusion score. RHS shows DeepInspect’s predicted
errors based on NAPVD score.
misclassified to another class b (e.g.,cello). For all the objects
of class a and b, it can be quantified as: type1conf(a, b) =
mean(P(a|b),P(b|a))—DNN’s probability to misclassify class
b as a and vice-versa, and takes the average value between
the two. For example, given two classes cello and violin,
type1conf estimates the mean probability of violin mis-
classified to cello and vise-versa. Note that, this is a bi-
directional score, i.e. misclassification of b as a is the same as
misclassification of a as b.
Type2 confusions: For multi-label classification, Type2
confusion occurs when an input image contains an object of
class a (e.g.,keyboard) and no object of class b (e.g.,mouse),
but the model predicts both classes (See Figure 8. For a
pair of classes, this can be quantified as: type2conf(a, b) =
mean(P((a, b)|a),P((a, b)|b)) to compute the probability to
detect two objects in the presence of only one. For exam-
ple, given two classes keyboard and mouse, type2conf
estimates the mean probability of mouse being predicted
while predicting keyboard and vise-versa. Similar to Type1
confusion, this is also a bi-directional score.
We measure type1conf and type2conf by using a DNN’s
true classification error measured on a set of test images.
They create the DNN’s true confusion characteristics between
all possible class-pairs. We then draw the distributions of
type1conf and type2conf , as shown in Figure 3a. The class-
pairs having confusion scores greater than 1 standard deviation
from the mean-value are then marked as pairs truly confused by
the model and form our ground truth of confusion errors. For
example, in COCO dataset, there are 80 classes and thus 3160
class pairs(80*79/2). 178 class-pairs of them are ground-truth
confusion errors.
Note that, different from how a bug/error is defined in
traditional software engineering, our suspicious confusion pairs
have an inherent probabilistic nature. For example, even if
a and b represent a confusion pair, it does not mean that
all the images containing a or b will be misclassified by the
model. Rather, it means that compared with other pairs, images
containing a or b tend to have higher chance to be misclassified
by the model.
2) GT of Bias: A DNN model is biased if it treats two
classes differently. For example, consider three classes: man,
woman, and surfboard. An unbiased model should not
have different error rates while classifying man or woman in
the presence of surfboard. To measure such bias formally,
we define confusion disparity (cd) to measure differences
of error between classes a and c and that between b and
c: cd(a, b, c) = |error(a, c) − error(b, c)|, where the error
measure can be either type1conf or type2conf as defined
earlier. cd essentially estimates the disparity of the model’s
error between classes a, b (e.g., man, woman) w.r.t. a third
class c (e.g., surfboard).
We also define an aggregated measure average confusion
disparity (abbreviated as avg_cd) between two classes a and
b by summing up the bias between them over all third classes
and take average:
avg_cd(a, b) :=
1
|O| − 2
∑
c∈O,c6=a,b
cd(a, b, c).
Depending on the error types we used to estimate avg_cd,
we refer to Type1_avg_cd and Type2_avg_cd. We measure
avg_cd using true classification error rate reported by DNN
for the test images. Similar to confusion errors, we draw the
distribution of avg_cd for all possible class pairs and then
consider the pairs as truly biased if their avg_cd score is
higher than 1 standard deviation from the mean value. Such
truly biased pairs form our ground truth of bias errors.
C. Evaluating DeepInspect
We evaluate DeepInspect using test set.
1) DeepInspect’s Error Reporting: DeepInspect reports
confusion errors based on NAPVD (See Equation (2))
scores—lower NAPVD indicates errors. We draw the distri-
butions of NAPVDs for all possible class pairs, as shown
in Figure 3b. Class pairs having NAPVD scores lower than 1
standard deviation from the mean score is marked as potential
confusion errors.
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As discussed in Section III-C, DeepInspect reports bias
errors based on avg_bias score (See Equation (4)), where
higher avg_bias means class pairs are more prone to bias
errors. Similar to above, from the distribution of avg_bias
scores, DeepInspect predicts pairs with avg_bias greater than
1 standard deviation from the mean score to be erroneous.
Note that, while calculating error disparity between classes a,
b w.r.t. c (See Equation (3)), if both a and b are far from c in
the embedded space ρ, disparity of their distances (∆) should
not reflect true bias. Thus, while calculating avg_bias(a, b) we
further filter out the triplets where ∆(c, a) > th∧∆(c, b) > th,
where th is some pre-defined threshold. In our experiment,
we remove all the class-pairs having ∆ larger than 1 standard
deviation (i.e. th) below the mean value of all Deltas across
all the class-pairs.
2) Evaluation Metric: We evaluate DeepInspect in two ways:
Precision & Recall: We use precision and recall to measure
DeepInspect’s accuracy. For each error type t, suppose that
E is the number of errors detected by DeepInspect and A is
the number of true errors in the ground truth set. Then the
precision and recall of DeepInspect are
|A ∩ E|
|E| and
|A ∩ E|
|A|
respectively.
Area Under Cost Effective Curve (AUCEC): Similar to how
static analysis warnings are ranked based on their priority
levels [43], we also rank the erroneous class-pairs identified by
DeepInspect based on the decreasing order of error proneness,
i.e. most error-prone pairs will be at the top. To evaluate such
ranking we use a cost-effectiveness measure [44], AUCEC
(Area Under the Cost-Effectiveness Curve), which has become
standard to evaluate rank-based bug-prediction systems [43],
[45], [46].
Cost-Effectiveness evaluates when we inspect/test top n%
class-pairs in the ranked list (i.e. inspection cost), how many
true errors are found (i.e. effectiveness). Both cost and
effectiveness are normalized to 100%. Figure 7 shows cost on
the x-axis, and effectiveness on the y-axis indicating the portion
of the ground truth errors found. AUCEC is the area under
this curve. We compare DeepInspect’s performance against a
random model that picks random class-pairs for inspection [47].
We also show the performance of an optimal model that ranks
the class-pairs perfectly—if n% of all the class-pairs are truly
erroneous, the optimal model would rank them at the top such
that with lower inspection budget most of the errors will be
detected. The optimal curve gives the upper bound of the
ranking scheme.
V. RESULTS
We begin our investigation by checking whether de-facto
neuron coverage based metrics can capture class separation.
RQ1. For image classification applications, can white-box
metrics efficiently distinguish between different classes?
Here we first investigate whether popular white-box metrics
can distinguish between different classes. Then we investigate
whether DeepInspect can capture these differences. We evaluate
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Fig. 4: Distribution of neuron coverage per class-label for
COCO dataset. For clarity, the coverage is shown for randomly
picked 10 labels.
this RQ w.r.t. the training data since the DNN behaviors are
not tainted with inaccuracies associated with the test images.
RQ1a. Can Neuron Coverage distinguish between different
classes? Neuron Coverage (NC), proposed by Pei et al. [14],
computes the ratio of unique neurons activated by an input set
and the total number of neurons in a DNN. Here we compute
NC per class-label, i.e. for a given class-label, we measure
the number of neurons activated by the images tagged with
that label w.r.t. the total neurons. The activation threshold we
use is 0.5, which is the same as used by Pei et al. [14]. We
perform this experiment on COCO and CIFAR-100 to study
multi- and single-label classifications. Figure 4 shows results
for COCO. We observe similar results for CIFAR-100 .
Each boxplot in the figure shows the distribution of neuron
coverage per class-label across all the relevant images. These
boxplots visually show that different labels have very similar
NC distribution. We further compare these distributions using
Kruskal Test [48], which is a non-parametric way of comparing
more than two groups. Note that we choose a non-parametric
measure as NCs may not follow normal distributions. (Kruskal
Test is a parametric equivalent of the one-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA)) The result reports a p− value << 0.05,
i.e. some differences exist across these distributions. However, a
pairwise Cohend’s effect size for each class-label pair, as shown
in the following table, shows more than 56% and 78% class-
pairs for CIFAR-100 and COCO have small to negligible effect
size. This means neuron coverage cannot reliably distinguish
a majority of the class-labels.
Effect Size of neuron coverage across different classes
Exp Setting negligible small medium large
COCO 40.51% 38.19% 16.96% 4.34%
CIFAR-100 31.94% 25.69% 23.87% 18.48%
RQ1b. Can DeepGauge [30] distinguish between different
classes? Ma et al. argue that each neuron has a primary region
of operation; they identify this region by using a boundary
condition [low, high] on its output during the training time;
outputs outside this region ((−∞, low) ∪ (high,+∞)) are
marked as corner cases. Leveraging this notion, they introduce
multi-granular neuron and layer-level coverage criteria. For
neuron coverage they propose: (i) k-multisection coverage
to evaluate how thoroughly the primary region of a neuron
is covered, (ii) boundary coverage to compute how many
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corner cases are covered, and (iii) strong neuron activation
coverage to measure how many corner case region is covered
in (high,+∞) region. For layer-level coverage, they define (iv)
top-k neuron coverage to identify the most active k-neurons for
each layer, and (v) top-k neuron pattern for each test-case to
find a sequence of neurons from the top-k most active neurons
across each layer.
k−multisection neuron−boundary neuron−level top−k−neuron layer−level
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Fig. 5: Histogram of DeepGauge multi-granular coverage per
class-labels for COCO dataset
We investigate whether each of these metrics can distinguish
between different classes by measuring the above metrics
for individual input classes following the original paper
methodology. We first profiled every neuron upper- and lower-
bound for each class using the training images containing that
class-label. Next, we computed per class neuron coverages
using test images containing that class; for k-multisection
coverage we chose k = 100. For layer level coverages, we
directly used the input images containing each class, where
we select k = 1.
Figure 5 shows the results, i.e. histogram of the above five
coverage criteria for COCO dataset. For all the five coverage
criteria, there are many class-labels that share similar coverage.
For example, in COCO , there are 52 labels with k-multisection
neuron coverage with values between 0.31 and 0.32 (see
Figure 5). Similarly, there are 40 labels with 0 neuron boundary
coverage. Therefore, none of the five coverage criteria is an
effective way to distinguish between different classes. Similar
conclusion is drawn for CIFAR-100 dataset.
RQ1c. Can DeepInspect distinguish between different
classes? Our white box metric, Neuron Activation Probability
Matrix (ρ), by construction is designed per class. Hence it
will be unfair to directly measure its capability to distinguish
between different classes. Thus, we pose this question in a
slightly different way, as described below. For multi-label
classification, each image contains multiple class-labels. For
example, an image can have labels for both mouse and
keyboard. Such coincidence of labels may create confu-
sion—if two labels always appear together in the ground truth
set, no classifier can distinguish between them. To check how
many times two labels coincide, we define a coincidence score
between two labels La and Lb as: coincidence (La, Lb) =
mean(P (La, Lb|La) , P (La, Lb|Lb)).
The above formula computes the minimum probability of
labels La and Lb occurring together in an image given that one
of them is present. Note that this is a bi-directional score, i.e.
we treat the two labels similarly. The mean operation ensures
we detect the average coincidence of two directions. A low
value of coincidence_score indicates two class-labels are easy
to separate and vise-versa.
Now, to check DeepInspect’s capability to capture class
separation, we simply check the correlation between coinci-
dence_score and confusion score (NAPVD) from Equation 2
for all possible class-label pairs. Since only multi-label objects
can have label coincidences, we perform this experiment for
a pre-trained ResNet-50 model on the COCO multi-label
classification task. A Spearman correlation coefficient between
the confusion and coincidence scores reaches a value as high as
0.96, showing strong statistical significance. The result indicates
that DeepInspect can disambiguate most of the classes that
have a low confusion score.
Interestingly, we found some pairs where coincidence
score is high, but DeepInspect was able to isolate them.
For example, (cup,chair), (toilet,sink) etc. Manually
investigating such cases reveals that although these pairs often
appear together in the input images, there are also enough
instances when they appear by themselves. Thus DeepInspect
disambiguates between these classes and puts them far in the
embedded space ρ. These results indicate DeepInspect can also
learn some hidden patterns from the context and thus, can go
beyond inspecting the training data coincidence for evaluating
model bias/confusion, which is the de-facto technique among
machine learning researchers [5].
Result 1: DeepInspect is a better choice for identifying
class-separations than existing coverage based metrics for
image classification task.
We now investigate DeepInspect’s capability in detecting
confusion and bias errors in DNN models.
RQ2. Can we use DeepInspect to identify confusion errors
of a DNN model?
In this RQ, we report DeepInspect’s ability to detect
Type1/Type2 confusions w.r.t. to ground truth confusion errors,
as described in Section IV-B1.
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Fig. 6: Strong negative Spearman correlation (-0.55 and -0.86)
between NAPVD and ground-truth confusion scores.
We first explore the correlation between NAPVD and ground
truth Type1/Type2 confusion score. Strong correlation has been
found for all the 10 experimental settings. Figure 6 gives
examples on COCO and CIFAR-10. These results indicate that
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TABLE III: Performance of DeepInspect on detecting confusion
errors at two different settings.
NAPVD < mean-1std Top 1%
TP FP Precision Recall TP FP Precision Recall
COCO DeepInspect 138 256 0.35 0.775 31 0 1 0.174
random 22 372 0.056 0.124 1 30 0.032 0.006
COCO gender DeepInspect 139 286 0.327 0.827 32 0 1 0.19
random 22 403 0.052 0.131 1 31 0.031 0.006
NUS DeepInspect 2132 66453 0.031 0.869 1209 3780 0.242 0.493
random 337 68248 0.005 0.137 24 4965 0.005 0.01
CIFAR-100 DeepInspect 206 584 0.261 0.718 39 10 0.796 0.136
random 45 745 0.057 0.157 2 47 0.041 0.007
R CIFAR-10 S DeepInspect 4 6 0.4 0.8 - - - -
random 1 9 0.1 0.2 - - - -
R CIFAR-10 L DeepInspect 3 4 0.43 0.6 - - - -
random 0 7 0 0 - - - -
R CIFAR-10 R DeepInspect 5 3 0.625 1 - - - -
random 0 8 0 0 - - - -
Tiny ImageNet DeepInspect 832 2477 0.251 0.607 122 77 0.613 0.089
random 227 3082 0.069 0.166 13 185 0.065 0.01
ImageNet DeepInspect 4014 69957 0.054 0.617 1073 3922 0.215 0.165
random 962 73009 0.013 0.148 65 4930 0.013 0.01
imSitu DeepInspect 48 58 0.453 0.165 31 19 0.62 0.107
random 6 100 0.057 0.02 2 48 0.04 0.007
NAPVD can be used to detect confusion errors—lower NAPVD
means more confusion.
By default, DeepInspect reports all the class-pairs with
NAPVD scores 1 standard deviation less than mean NAPVD
score as error-prone (See Figure 3b). In this setting, as the
result shown on Table III, DeepInspect reports errors at high
recall under most settings. Specifically, on NUS, CIFAR-100
and robust CIFAR-10 ResNet, DeepInspect can report errors
as high as 86.9%, 71.8%, and 100%, respectively. In total,
DeepInspect has identified thousands of confusion errors.
If higher precision is wanted, a user can choose to inspect
only a small set of confused pairs based on NAPVD. As also
shown in Table III, when the top1% confusion errors are
reported, a much higher precision have been achieved for all
the datasets. In particular, DeepInspect identifies 31 and 39
confusion errors for COCO model and CIFAR-100 model
with 100% and 79.6% precisions respectively. The trade-off
between precision and recall can be found on the cost-effective
curves shown on Figure 7, which shows overall performance
of DeepInspect at different inspection cutoffs. Overall, w.r.t.
a random baseline model, DeepInspect is gaining AUCEC
performance from 61.6% to 85.7%. In fact, for the Robust
CIFAR-10 models, DeepInspect’s performance is close to
optimal.
Figure 8 and Figure 9 give some specific confusion errors
found by DeepInspect in the COCO and the ImageNet settings.
In particular, as shown in Figure 8a, when there is only
keyboard but no mouse in the image, the COCO model reports
both. Similarly, Figure 9a shows a confusion errors (cello,
violin). There are several cellos in this image, but the model
predicts it to be a violin.
Across all the three robust CIFAR-10 models, DeepInspect
identifies (cat, dog), (bird, deer) and (automobile, truck) as
erroneous pairs where one class is very likely to be mistakenly
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
%
 o
f e
rro
rs
 fo
un
d
COCO
Gain=80.3%
COCO gender
Gain=80.1%
% of pairs inspected
NUS
Gain=85.7%
CIFAR-100
Gain=72.6%
Robust CIFAR-10 Small
Gain=79.0%
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
%
 o
f e
rro
rs
 fo
un
d
Robust CIFAR-10 Large
Gain=77.0%
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Robust CIFAR-10 ResNet
Gain=82.0%
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
% of pairs inspected
Tiny ImageNet
Gain=61.8%
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
ImageNet
Gain=61.6%
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
imSitu
Gain=64.0%
optimal
random
DeepInspect
Fig. 7: AUCEC plot of Type1/Type2 Confusion errors detected
in 10 different settings. The red vertical line shows the mark of
1-standard deviation less from mean NAVD score. DeepInspect marks
all class-pairs with NAVD scores less than the red mark as potential
errors. The gain reports DeepInspect’s AUCEC gain over random.
(a) (keyboard,mouse) (b) (oven,microwave)
Fig. 8: Confusion errors identified in COCO model. In each pair
the second object is mistakenly identified by the model.
(a) (cello, violin) (b) (library, bookshop)
Fig. 9: Confusion errors identified in ImageNet model. In each
pair the second object is mistakenly identified by the model.
classified as the other class of the pair. This indicates that
these confusion errors are to be tied to the training data, so
all the models trained in this dataset including robust models
may have these errors. These results further show that the
confusion errors are orthogonal to the norm-based adversarial
perturbations and we need a different technique to address
them.
Result 2: DeepInspect can find confusion errors with
precision 21% to 100% at top1% for both single- and
multi-object classification tasks. DeepInspect also detects
confusion errors in state-of-the art robust models.
RQ3. Can we use DeepInspect to identify bias errors of a
DNN model?
We evaluate this RQ by estimating a model’s bias (avg_bias)
using Equation (4) w.r.t. the ground truth (avg_cd) computed
following Section IV-B2. We first explore the correlation
between pairwise avg_cd and our proposed pairwise avg_bias;
Figure 10 shows the results for the COCO dataset and the
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Fig. 10: Strong positive Spearman’s correlation (0.76 and 0.62)
exists between avg_cd and avg_bias while detecting classification
bias.
CIFAR-100 dataset. Similar trends also happen in other datasets
we study. The results show that a strong correlation exists
between avg_cd and avg_bias. In other words, our proposed
avg_bias is a good proxy for detecting bias errors.
TABLE IV: Performance of DeepInspect on detecting bias errors
at two different cutoffs
NAPVD > mean+1std Top 1%
TP FP Precision Recall TP FP Precision Recall
COCO DeepInspect 249 278 0.472 0.759 24 8 0.75 0.073
random 54 472 0.103 0.167 3 28 0.103 0.01
COCO gender DeepInspect 218 325 0.401 0.568 17 16 0.515 0.044
random 64 478 0.118 0.168 3 28 0.118 0.01
NUS DeepInspect 23275 25662 0.476 0.44 1900 3095 0.38 0.036
random 5180 43756 0.106 0.098 528 4466 0.106 0.01
CIFAR-100 DeepInspect 310 543 0.363 0.38 29 21 0.58 0.036
random 140 711 0.165 0.172 8 41 0.165 0.01
R CIFAR-10 S DeepInspect 7 4 0.636 0.778 - - - -
random 2 8 0.2 0.222 - - - -
R CIFAR-10 L DeepInspect 6 7 0.462 0.667 - - - -
random 2 9 0.2 0.267 - - - -
R CIFAR-10 R DeepInspect 6 3 0.667 0.667 - - - -
random 1 7 0.2 0.2 - - - -
Tiny ImageNet DeepInspect 1361 1859 0.423 0.453 142 57 0.714 0.047
random 486 2732 0.151 0.162 30 168 0.151 0.01
ImageNet DeepInspect 26704 48913 0.353 0.33 3253 1742 0.651 0.04
random 12234 63381 0.162 0.151 808 4186 0.162 0.01
imSitu DeepInspect 408 311 0.567 0.718 43 8 0.843 0.076
random 80 638 0.112 0.142 5 44 0.112 0.01
As in RQ2, we also do a precision-recall analysis of
finding the bias errors across all the datasets at two specific
cutoffs. We analyze the precision and recall of DeepInspect
when reporting bias errors at cutoff Top1%(avg_bias) and
mean(avg_bias)+standard deviation(avg_bias), respectively. The
results are shown in Table IV. At cutoff Top1%(avg_bias),
DeepInspect has high precision. In particular, DeepInspect can
detect ground truth suspicious pairs with precision as high as
75% and 84% for COCO and imSitu respectively. At cutoff
mean(avg_bias)+standard deviation(avg_bias), DeepInspect
has high recall but relatively low precision. In particular,
DeepInspect can detect ground truth suspicious pairs with
recall as high as 75.9% and 71.8% recall for COCO and imSitu
respectively. DeepInspect can report 657(=249+408) true bias
errors in total for the two models. DeepInspect outperforms the
random baseline by a large margin at both cutoffs. As in the
case of detecting confusion errors, a trade-off between precision
and recall exists here. This can be customized based on a user’s
need. The cost-effective analysis, as shown on Figure 11, shows
the entire spectrum.
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Fig. 11: Bias errors detected w.r.t. the ground truth of avg_cd
beyond one standard deviation from mean. The gain reports
DeepInspect’s AUCEC gain over random.
As shown in the figure, DeepInspect outperforms the random
baseline by a large margin. The AUCEC gains of DeepInspect
over the random baseline are from 37% to 76% across the
10 settings. The performance of DeepInspect is close to the
optimal curve under some settings. Specifically, the AUCEC
gains of the optimal over DeepInspect are only 7.11% and
7.95% under the COCO and ImSitu settings, respectively.
Inspired by [5], which shows bias exists between man and
woman in COCO with gender in the task of image captioning,
we analyze the most biased third class c for a and b being
man and woman in COCO and imSitu. As shown in Figure
12, we found that sports like skis, snowboard, and surfboard
is more closely associated with man and thus misleads the
model to predict women in the images to be men. Figure 13
shows results on imSitu, we found that the model tends to
associate the class “inside” with woman while associate the
class “outside” with man.
Fig. 12: The model classifies the women in these pictures as men
in COCO dataset.
We generalize the idea by choosing classes a and b to be
any class-pair. We found that similar bias also exists in the
single-label classification settings. For example, in ImageNet,
one of the highest bias is between Eskimo_dog and rapeseed
w.r.t. Siberian_husky. The model tends to confuse between the
two dogs but not between Eskimo_dog and rapeseed. This
makes sense since Eskimo_dog and Siberian_husk are all dogs
and are more easily to be misclassified by the model.
Note that, one of the fairness violations of a DNN system
is the drastic difference on accuracy across groups divided
according to some sensitive feature(s). In black-box testing,
the tester can get a number indicating the degree of fairness
has been violated by feeding into the model a validation set.
In contrast, DeepInspect provides a new angle to the fairness
violations. The neuron distance difference between two classes
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Fig. 13: The model classifies the man in the first figure to be a
woman and the woman in the second figure to be a man.
a and b w.r.t. a third class c sheds light on why the model
tends to be more likely to confuse between one of them and c
than the other. We leave a more comprehensive examination
on interpreting bias/fairness violations for future work.
Result 3: DeepInspect can find bias errors for both
single- and multi-label classification tasks and even for
the robust models from 38% to 84% precisions at top 1%.
VI. THREATS TO VALIDITY
Although DeepInspect can find confusion and bias errors,
its performance relies on the the accuracy of the model it tests.
Since DeepInspect groups images according to the predicted
labels, in the case when the model has very low testing accuracy,
the embedding of objects in ρ will not be accurate and thus
leads to inferior testing performance.
Another limitation is that DeepInspect needs to decide
thresholds for both confusion errors and bias errors. We
minimize this threat by choosing thresholds that are 1 standard
deviation far from the corresponding mean values.
The task of classifying any possible object accurately is
notoriously difficult. Here we simplify the problem to test the
DNN model for the classes that it has seen before during the
training process. For example, if the model is trained with
cow’s images, we will test the model with variations of cows
correctly. However, we will not test the model for dinosaur
if it has never seen it during the training process.
VII. RELATED WORK
Software Testing & Verification of DNN. Prior research
proposed different white-box testing criteria based on neuron
coverage [13], [14], [30] and neuron-pair coverage [31]. Sun
et al. [49] further presented a concolic testing approach for
DNNs. They showed that their concolic testing approach can
effectively increase coverage and find adversarial examples.
There are also efforts to verify DNNs [35], [50]–[52] against
adversarial attacks. However, most of the verification efforts
are limited to small DNNs and limited system-wide properties
(e.g., range of pixel values). In contrast, we propose testing
strategies that test class separations. Our initial results indicate
that such metrics have potential to identify potential bias and
weakness of end-to-end DNN applications.
Adversarial Deep Learning. DNNs are known to be
vulnerable to well-crafted inputs called adversarial examples,
which are imperceptible to a human but can easily make
DNNs fail [53]–[60]. Much work has been done to defend
the adversarial attacks [61]–[69]. Our methods has potential
to identify adversarial inputs. Moreover, adversarial examples
are usually out of distribution data and not realistic, while we
do not require to generate any new transformed images to find
errors. Further, we can identify a general weakness or errors
rather than focusing on crafted attacks that often require strong
attacker model.
Interpreting DNN. There are many research on model
interpretability and visualization [70]–[75]. In particular, Dong
et al. [75] observed that instead of learning the semantic
features of the whole objects, neurons tend to react on different
parts of the objects in a recurrent manner. Our probabilistic way
to look at neuron activation per class aims to capture a wholistic
behavior of an entire classes instead of individual object so
that diverse features of class members can be captured. Closest
to ours is by Papernot et al. [76] who used nearest training
points to explain the adversarial attacks. In comparison, we
analyze the DNN’s dependencies on an entire training/testing
data and represent it in a matrix. By inspecting this matrix, we
can explain the bias and weaknesses of the DNN.
Evaluating model’s Bias/Fairness. Evaluating bias and
fairness of a system is important both from a theoretical and
a practical perspective [77]–[80]. At a high level, the related
studies first define a fairness criteria and then try to optimize
the original objective while satisfying the fairness creteria [81]–
[86]. These properties are defined either at individual [81], [87],
[88] or group levels [82], [89], [90]. In this work, we showed
the potential of DeepInspect in detecting group-level fairness.
Galhotra et al. [91] first applied the notion of software testing
for evaluating software fairness. In particular, they mutate
the sensitive features of the inputs and check whether the
output changes. One major problem with their proposed method
Themis is that it assumes the model it tests takes into sensitive
attribute(s) during training and inference time. Such assumption
is not realistic since most existing fairness-aware models drop
input sensitive feature(s). Besides, Themis will not work on
image classification, where the sensitive attribute (e.g. gender,
race) is a visual concept that cannot be flipped easily. In our
work, we use a white-box approach to measure the bias learned
by the model during training. Our testing method does not
assume the model we are testing taking into any sensitive
feature(s). we propose a new fairness notion for the setting
of multi-object classification: average confusion disparity and
a proxy average bias to measure it for any deep learning
models even when only unlabeled testing data is provided. In
addition, our method tries to provide an explanation behind
such discrimination. A complementary approach by Papernot
et al. [76] shows such explainability behind model bias in
single-label classification setting.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a white box DNN testing frame-
work, which can automatically detect confusion and bias errors
in DNN-based image classification models. We implemented
DeepInspect and applied it on 8 different popular image
classification datasets and 10 pretrained DNN models including
4 pre-trained robust models. We show that DeepInspect is able
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to detect errors for both single- and multi-label classification
models with high precision. We also put all the errors that
DeepInspect detected on the public website.
In this work, we mainly focus on detecting confusion/bias
errors. A natural follow-up question is how to fix these errors.
Unlike fixing bugs in traditional software, fixing errors in
DNNs is an open problem and often requires retraining the
models. Preliminary results on COCO dataset have shown
that by augmenting the training datasets with images from
confusing class pairs could reduce the confusion errors. We
leave a more comprehensive examination of how to fix the
confusion and bias errors found by DeepInspect to the future
work.
REFERENCES
[1] P. Kamavisdar, S. Saluja, and S. Agrawal, “A survey on image classifi-
cation approaches and techniques,” International Journal of Advanced
Research in Computer and Communication Engineering, vol. 2, no. 1,
pp. 1005–1009, 2013.
[2] K. He, X. Zhang, S. Ren, and J. Sun, “Deep residual learning for image
recognition,” in Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer vision
and pattern recognition, 2016, pp. 770–778.
[3] L. Grush, “Google engineer apologizes after photos app
tags two black people as gorillas,” 2015. [Online]. Avail-
able: https://www.theverge.com/2015/7/1/8880363/google-apologizes-
photos-app-tags-two-black-people-gorillas
[4] MalletsDarker, “I took a few shots at lake louise today
and google offered me this panorama,” 2018. [Online].
Available: https://www.reddit.com/r/funny/comments/7r9ptc/i_took_a_
few_shots_at_lake_louise_today_and/dsvv1nw/
[5] J. Zhao, T. Wang, M. Yatskar, V. Ordonez, and K.-W. Chang, “Men
also like shopping: Reducing gender bias amplification using corpus-
level constraints,” in Proceedings of the 2017 Conference on Empirical
Methods in Natural Language Processing, 2017, pp. 2941–2951. [Online].
Available: https://www.aclweb.org/anthology/D17-1319
[6] A. Rosenfeld, R. S. Zemel, and J. K. Tsotsos, “The elephant in
the room,” CoRR, vol. abs/1808.03305, 2018. [Online]. Available:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1808.03305
[7] A. Rose, “Are face-detection cameras racist?” 2010. [Online]. Available:
http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1954643,00.html
[8] J. Buolamwini and T. Gebru, “Gender shades: Intersectional accuracy
disparities in commercial gender classification,” in FAT, 2018.
[9] D. Amodei, C. Olah, J. Steinhardt, P. Christiano, J. S. Openai, D. Mané,
and G. Brain, “Concrete Problems in AI Safety.” [Online]. Available:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.06565.pdfhttp://arxiv.org/abs/1606.06565.pdf
[10] B. J. Taylor and M. A. Darrah, “Rule extraction as a formal method for
the verification and validation of neural networks,” in Neural Networks,
2005. IJCNN’05. Proceedings. 2005 IEEE International Joint Conference
on, vol. 5. IEEE, 2005, pp. 2915–2920.
[11] S. A. Seshia, D. Sadigh, and S. S. Sastry, “Towards verified artificial
intelligence,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1606.08514, 2016.
[12] T. Dreossi, S. Jha, and S. A. Seshia, “Semantic adversarial deep learning,”
in International Conference on Computer-Aided Verification (CAV), 2018.
[13] Y. Tian, K. Pei, S. Jana, and B. Ray, “Deeptest: Automated testing of deep-
neural-network-driven autonomous cars,” in International Conference of
Software Engineering (ICSE), 2018 IEEE conference on. IEEE, 2018.
[14] K. Pei, Y. Cao, J. Yang, and S. Jana, “Deepxplore: Automated whitebox
testing of deep learning systems,” pp. 1–18, 2017. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3132747.3132785
[15] V. Nair and G. E. Hinton, “Rectified linear units improve restricted
boltzmann machines,” in Proceedings of the 27th international conference
on machine learning (ICML-10), 2010, pp. 807–814.
[16] T. M. Mitchell, Machine Learning, 1st ed. New York, NY, USA:
McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1997.
[17] Y. LeCun, L. Bottou, Y. Bengio, P. Haffner et al., “Gradient-based
learning applied to document recognition,” Proceedings of the IEEE,
vol. 86, no. 11, pp. 2278–2324, 1998.
[18] D. E. Rumelhart, G. E. Hinton, and R. J. Williams, “Learning represen-
tations by back-propagating errors,” Cognitive modeling, vol. 5, no. 3,
p. 1, 1988.
[19] D. Sculley, G. Holt, D. Golovin, E. Davydov, T. Phillips, D. Ebner,
V. Chaudhary, and M. Young, “Machine learning: The high interest
credit card of technical debt,” 2014.
[20] G. Tsoumakas and I. Katakis, “Multi-label classification: An overview,”
International Journal of Data Warehousing and Mining (IJDWM), vol. 3,
no. 3, pp. 1–13, 2007.
[21] A. Krizhevsky, “Learning multiple layers of features from tiny images,”
University of Toronto, 05 2012.
[22] O. Russakovsky, J. Deng, H. Su, J. Krause, S. Satheesh, S. Ma, Z. Huang,
A. Karpathy, A. Khosla, M. Bernstein, A. C. Berg, and L. Fei-Fei,
“ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge,” International
Journal of Computer Vision (IJCV), vol. 115, no. 3, pp. 211–252, 2015.
[23] T.-Y. Lin, M. Maire, S. Belongie, J. Hays, P. Perona, D. Ramanan,
P. Dollár, and C. L. Zitnick, “Microsoft coco: Common objects in context,”
in European conference on computer vision. Springer, 2014, pp. 740–
755.
[24] T.-S. Chua, J. Tang, R. Hong, H. Li, Z. Luo, and Y.-T. Zheng, “Nus-wide:
A real-world web image database from national university of singapore,”
in Proc. of ACM Conf. on Image and Video Retrieval (CIVR’09), Santorini,
Greece., July 8-10, 2009.
[25] M. Yatskar, L. Zettlemoyer, and A. Farhadi, “Situation recognition:
Visual semantic role labeling for image understanding,” in Conference
on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2016.
[26] Y. Bengio, A. Courville, and P. Vincent, “Representation learning: A
review and new perspectives,” IEEE transactions on pattern analysis
and machine intelligence, vol. 35, no. 8, pp. 1798–1828, 2013.
[27] I. H. Witten, E. Frank, M. A. Hall, and C. J. Pal, Data Mining: Practical
machine learning tools and techniques. Morgan Kaufmann, 2016.
[28] “Inside waymo’s secret world for training self-driving cars,”
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/08/inside-
waymos-secret-testing-and-simulation-facilities/537648/, 2017.
[29] “Google auto waymo disengagement report for autonomous driving,”
https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/wcm/connect/946b3502-c959-4e3b-
b119-91319c27788f/GoogleAutoWaymo_disengage_report_2016.pdf?
MOD=AJPERES, 2016.
[30] L. Ma, F. Juefei-Xu, F. Zhang, J. Sun, M. Xue, B. Li, C. Chen, T. Su,
L. Li, Y. Liu, J. Zhao, and Y. Wang, “Deepgauge: Multi-granularity
testing criteria for deep learning systems,” pp. 120–131, 2018. [Online].
Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3238147.3238202
[31] Y. Sun, X. Huang, and D. Kroening, “Testing deep neural networks,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1803.04792, 2018.
[32] I. Goodfellow and N. Papernot, “The challenge of verification and testing
of machine learning,” http://www.cleverhans.io/security/privacy/ml/2017/
06/14/verification.html, 2017.
[33] T. J. Ostrand and M. J. Balcer, “The category-partition method for
specifying and generating fuctional tests,” Communications of the ACM,
vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 676–686, 1988.
[34] D. Hamlet and R. Taylor, “Partition testing does not inspire confidence
(program testing),” IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, vol. 16,
no. 12, pp. 1402–1411, 1990.
[35] X. Huang, M. Kwiatkowska, S. Wang, and M. Wu, “Safety verification of
deep neural networks,” in International Conference on Computer Aided
Verification. Springer, 2017, pp. 3–29.
[36] J. Kim, R. Feldt, and S. Yoo, “Guiding deep learning system testing using
surprise adequacy,” in Proceedings of the 41th International Conference
on Software Engineering, ser. ICSE 2019, 2019.
[37] V. O. Tianlu Wang, Kota Yamaguchi, “Deep residual learning for image
recognition,” in Feedback-prop: Convolutional Neural Network Inference
under Partial Evidence(CVPR), 2018.
[38] “Base pretrained models and datasets in pytorch,” 2017. [Online].
Available: https://github.com/aaron-xichen/pytorch-playground
[39] E. Wong, F. Schmidt, J. H. Metzen, and J. Z. Kolter, “Scaling provable
adversarial defenses,” in Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems 31, S. Bengio, H. Wallach, H. Larochelle, K. Grauman,
N. Cesa-Bianchi, and R. Garnett, Eds. Curran Associates, Inc., 2018,
pp. 8410–8419. [Online]. Available: http://papers.nips.cc/paper/8060-
scaling-provable-adversarial-defenses.pdf
[40] K. Simonyan and A. Zisserman, “Very deep convolutional networks for
large-scale image recognition,” in International Conference on Learning
Representations (ICLR), 2015.
[41] “Tiny imagenet visual recognition challenge,” 2017. [Online]. Available:
https://tiny-imagenet.herokuapp.com/
[42] S. Wang, Y. Chen, A. Abdou, and S. Jana, “Mixtrain: Scalable training
of formally robust neural networks,” CoRR, vol. abs/1811.02625, 2018.
[Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1811.02625
11
[43] F. Rahman and P. Devanbu, “How, and why, process metrics are better,”
in 2013 35th International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE).
IEEE, 2013, pp. 432–441.
[44] E. Arisholm, L. C. Briand, and E. B. Johannessen, “A systematic and
comprehensive investigation of methods to build and evaluate fault
prediction models.” JSS, vol. 83, no. 1, pp. 2–17, 2010.
[45] F. Rahman, D. Posnett, A. Hindle, E. Barr, and P. Devanbu, “Bugcache
for inspections: hit or miss?” in Proceedings of the 19th ACM SIGSOFT
symposium and the 13th European conference on Foundations of software
engineering. ACM, 2011, pp. 322–331.
[46] B. Ray, V. Hellendoorn, S. Godhane, Z. Tu, A. Bacchelli, and P. De-
vanbu, “On the" naturalness" of buggy code,” in 2016 IEEE/ACM 38th
International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE). IEEE, 2016,
pp. 428–439.
[47] I. H. Witten and E. Frank, Data Mining: Practical machine learning
tools and techniques. Morgan Kaufmann, 2005.
[48] W. H. Kruskal and W. A. Wallis, “Use of ranks in one-criterion
variance analysis,” Journal of the American Statistical Association,
vol. 47, no. 260, pp. 583–621, 1952. [Online]. Available: https:
//www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01621459.1952.10483441
[49] Y. Sun, M. Wu, W. Ruan, X. Huang, M. Kwiatkowska, and D. Kroening,
“Concolic testing for deep neural networks,” in Proceedings of the 33rd
ACM/IEEE International Conference on Automated Software Engineering,
ser. ASE 2018. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2018, pp. 109–119.
[Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3238147.3238172
[50] K. Pei, Y. Cao, J. Yang, and S. Jana, “Towards practical verification of
machine learning: The case of computer vision systems,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1712.01785, 2017.
[51] G. Katz, C. Barrett, D. L. Dill, K. Julian, and M. J. Kochenderfer,
Reluplex: An Efficient SMT Solver for Verifying Deep Neural Networks.
Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017, pp. 97–117.
[52] S. Wang, K. Pei, J. Whitehouse, J. Yang, and S. Jana, “Formal security
analysis of neural networks using symbolic intervals,” 2018.
[53] X. Yuan, P. He, Q. Zhu, and X. Li, “Adversarial examples: Attacks and
defenses for deep learning,” IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and
Learning Systems, pp. 1–20, 2019.
[54] A. Raghunathan, J. Steinhardt, and P. Liang, “Certified defenses
against adversarial examples,” 6th International Conference on Learning
Representations (ICLR), 2018.
[55] I. J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy, “Explaining and harnessing
adversarial examples,” in International Conference on Learning Repre-
sentations (ICLR), 2015.
[56] A. Nguyen, J. Yosinski, and J. Clune, “Deep neural networks are easily
fooled: High confidence predictions for unrecognizable images,” in
Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern
Recognition, 2015, pp. 427–436.
[57] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, S. Jha, M. Fredrikson, Z. B. Celik, and
A. Swami, “The limitations of deep learning in adversarial settings,” in
2016 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P).
IEEE, 2016, pp. 372–387.
[58] C. Szegedy, W. Zaremba, I. Sutskever, J. Bruna, D. Erhan, I. Goodfellow,
and R. Fergus, “Intriguing properties of neural networks,” in International
Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR), 2014.
[59] S. Huang, N. Papernot, I. Goodfellow, Y. Duan, and P. Abbeel, “Adversar-
ial attacks on neural network policies,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.02284,
2017.
[60] A. Kurakin, I. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio, “Adversarial examples in the
physical world,” in Workshop track, 2017.
[61] O. Bastani, Y. Ioannou, L. Lampropoulos, D. Vytiniotis, A. Nori, and
A. Criminisi, “Measuring neural net robustness with constraints,” in
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 2016, pp. 2613–
2621.
[62] N. Carlini and D. Wagner, “Towards evaluating the robustness of neural
networks,” in Security and Privacy (SP), 2017 IEEE Symposium on.
IEEE, 2017, pp. 39–57.
[63] S. Gu and L. Rigazio, “Towards deep neural network architectures
robust to adversarial examples,” in International Conference on Learning
Representations (ICLR), 2015.
[64] J. H. Metzen, T. Genewein, V. Fischer, and B. Bischoff, “On detecting
adversarial perturbations,” in International Conference on Learning
Representations (ICLR), 2017.
[65] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, X. Wu, S. Jha, and A. Swami, “Distillation
as a defense to adversarial perturbations against deep neural networks,”
in Security and Privacy (SP), 2016 IEEE Symposium on. IEEE, 2016,
pp. 582–597.
[66] U. Shaham, Y. Yamada, and S. Negahban, “Understanding adversarial
training: Increasing local stability of neural nets through robust optimiza-
tion,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1511.05432, 2015.
[67] W. Xu, D. Evans, and Y. Qi, “Feature squeezing: Detecting adversarial
examples in deep neural networks,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1704.01155,
2017.
[68] S. Zheng, Y. Song, T. Leung, and I. Goodfellow, “Improving the
robustness of deep neural networks via stability training,” in Proceedings
of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition,
2016, pp. 4480–4488.
[69] W. He, J. Wei, X. Chen, N. Carlini, and D. Song, “Adversarial example
defenses: Ensembles of weak defenses are not strong,” in Proceedings of
the 11th USENIX Conference on Offensive Technologies, ser. WOOT’17.
Berkeley, CA, USA: USENIX Association, 2017, pp. 15–15. [Online].
Available: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3154768.3154783
[70] Z. C. Lipton, “The mythos of model interpretability,” Proceedings of the
33rd International Conference on Machine Learning Workshop, 2016.
[71] Q.-s. Zhang and S.-C. Zhu, “Visual interpretability for deep learning: a
survey,” Frontiers of Information Technology & Electronic Engineering,
vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 27–39, 2018.
[72] R. R. Selvaraju, M. Cogswell, A. Das, R. Vedantam, D. Parikh, and
D. Batra, “Grad-cam: Visual explanations from deep networks via
gradient-based localization,” in 2017 IEEE International Conference
on Computer Vision (ICCV), Oct 2017, pp. 618–626.
[73] G. Montavon, W. Samek, and K.-R. Müller, “Methods for interpreting
and understanding deep neural networks,” Digital Signal Processing,
2017.
[74] D. Bau, B. Zhou, A. Khosla, A. Oliva, and A. Torralba, “Network
dissection: Quantifying interpretability of deep visual representations,”
in Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2017.
[75] Y. Dong, H. Su, J. Zhu, and F. Bao, “Towards interpretable deep
neural networks by leveraging adversarial examples,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1708.05493, 2017.
[76] N. Papernot and P. McDaniel, “Deep k-nearest neighbors: Towards
confident, interpretable and robust deep learning,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1803.04765, 2018.
[77] B. T. Luong, S. Ruggieri, and F. Turini, “k-nn as an implementation
of situation testing for discrimination discovery and prevention,” in
Proceedings of the 17th ACM SIGKDD international conference on
Knowledge discovery and data mining. ACM, 2011, pp. 502–510.
[78] R. Zemel, Y. Wu, K. Swersky, T. Pitassi, and C. Dwork, “Learning fair
representations,” in Proceedings of the 30th International Conference on
Machine Learning, 2013, pp. 325–333.
[79] M. B. Zafar, I. Valera, M. Gomez Rodriguez, and K. P. Gummadi,
“Fairness constraints: Mechanisms for fair classification,” vol. 54, 2017.
[80] Y. Brun and A. Meliou, “Software fairness,” in Proceedings of
the 2018 26th ACM Joint Meeting on European Software Engineering
Conference and Symposium on the Foundations of Software Engineering,
ser. ESEC/FSE 2018. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2018, pp. 754–759.
[Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3236024.3264838
[81] C. Dwork, M. Hardt, T. Pitassi, O. Reingold, and R. S. Zemel, “Fairness
through awareness,” In Proceedings of the Innovations in Theoretical
Computer Science Conference, vol. abs/1104.3913, pp. 214–226, 2012.
[82] M. Hardt, E. Price, and N. Srebro, “Equality of opportunity in supervised
learning,” in Proceedings of the 30th International Conference on Neural
Information Processing Systems, ser. NIPS’16, USA, 2016, pp. 3323–
3331.
[83] S. Barocas, M. Hardt, and A. Narayanan, Fairness and Machine Learning.
fairmlbook.org, 2018, http://www.fairmlbook.org.
[84] A. K. Menon and R. C. Williamson, “The cost of fairness in
binary classification,” in Conference on Fairness, Accountability and
Transparency, FAT 2018, 23-24 February 2018, New York, NY, USA,
2018, pp. 107–118. [Online]. Available: http://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/
menon18a.html
[85] M. Donini, L. Oneto, S. Ben-David, J. Shawe-Taylor, and
M. Pontil, “Empirical risk minimization under fairness constraints,”
in Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 31: Annual
Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2018, NeurIPS
2018, 3-8 December 2018, Montréal, Canada., 2018, pp. 2796–2806.
[Online]. Available: http://papers.nips.cc/paper/7544-empirical-risk-
minimization-under-fairness-constraints
[86] A. L. Lamy, Z. Zhong, A. K. Menon, and N. Verma, “Noise-tolerant fair
classification,” CoRR, vol. abs/1901.10837, 2019. [Online]. Available:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1901.10837
12
[87] M. J. Kusner, J. Loftus, C. Russell, and R. Silva, “Counterfactual fairness,”
in Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 30, 2017, pp.
4066–4076.
[88] M. P. Kim, O. Reingold, and G. N. Rothblum, “Fairness through
computationally-bounded awareness,” 32nd Conference on Neural Infor-
mation Processing Systems (NeurIPS 2018), 2018.
[89] T. Calders, F. Kamiran, and M. Pechenizkiy, “Building classifiers with
independency constraints,” in 2009 IEEE International Conference on
Data Mining Workshops, Dec 2009, pp. 13–18.
[90] M. B. Zafar, I. Valera, M. Gomez Rodriguez, and K. P. Gummadi,
“Fairness beyond disparate treatment & disparate impact: Learning
classification without disparate mistreatment,” in Proceedings of the 26th
International Conference on World Wide Web, 2017, pp. 1171–1180.
[91] S. Galhotra, Y. Brun, and A. Meliou, “Fairness testing: testing software
for discrimination,” in Proceedings of the 2017 11th Joint Meeting on
Foundations of Software Engineering. ACM, 2017, pp. 498–510.
13
